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One way to make development pathways more resilient in the face of a changing climate has 
been through mainstreaming adaptation into government policies, planning and sectoral decision-
making. To date, many of the transferable lessons have taken the form of technical approaches 
such as risk assessments and toolkits. This article instead draws on evidence from South Asia 
to emphasise some of the more tacit and informal approaches used to influence adaptation policy. 
Despite their apparent significance in policy processes, such tactics are often neither planned for 
nor well reported in resilience-building projects and programme documents. Using evidence to 
populate a typology of influencing strategies, this article looks particularly at the role of policy 
entrepreneurs who navigate the political complexity of both formal and informal governance 
systems to promote successful adaptation mainstreaming. It concludes with recommendations for 
adaptation and resilience programming that can more effectively harness the breadth of influenc-
ing strategies.
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Introduction
There is growing awareness of the need for government policy and planning to 
enhance resilience by adapting to the changing climate, fuelled by international 
events such as the 2015 Paris Climate Summit and periodic media interest follow-
ing climate-related disaster events. Acknowledging the inherent inter-relationships 
between adaptation and development processes, many efforts attempt to integrate 
or ‘mainstream’ climate change into development planning and sectoral decision-
making (Mitchell et al., 2009; Bickersteth et al., 2017). Adaptation measures thereby 
become ‘part of a broader suite of measures within existing development processes 
and decision cycles’ (OECD, 2009, p. 60). 
 Mainstreaming may be horizontal, where climate objectives are compatible with 
policies and mechanisms across sectors (such as agriculture, water or health), or 
vertical across government hierarchies (international, national, sub-national). Such 
integration is supported because it can coordinate across actions across different sec-
tors and scales and ensure the long-term sustainability of investments, and is seen as 
more efficient and effective than designing, implementing and managing climate 
policy separately from ongoing development efforts (Persson and Klein, 2008). 
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 Many of the transferable lessons on mainstreaming to date relate to technical 
approaches to supporting mainstreaming, such as providing training and preparing 
risk assessments and toolkits. Yet the literature on political economy and policy 
processes also underlines the importance of understanding adaptation processes in 
terms of the more informal, tacit processes that are involved (Court and Maxwell, 
2005; Birkmann et al., 2010; Naess et al., 2015). This article combines perspective 
and theories on policy-influencing from the literature with empirical evidence from 
the Action on Climate Today (ACT) programme in South Asia, a five-year initia-
tive that works closely with governments to develop strategies to build resilience to 
the impact of climate change. 
 As such, the article looks in particular at the processes of policy-influencing 
employed by externally financed technical support programmes such as ACT, testing 
the results by populating a transferable typology of influencing strategies. While the 
line between formal and informal strategies is blurred, the analysis draws particular 
attention to more informal strategies and mechanisms that can inform governments’ 
response to assessing and managing climate risk. Despite their apparent significance 
in policy processes, these informal tactics are often neither planned for nor well 
reported in resilience-building projects and programme documents. Finally, the 
article provides lessons and guidance for structuring technical assistance support to 
optimise the potential for policy influence and for securing ownership of adapta-
tion by governments. 
 This article will be of interest to all those seeking to influence policy on climate 
change adaptation, and in particular to those designing and providing technical 
assistance to support national and sub-national governments to mainstream adapta-
tion into their development policies. 
Influencing resilience policy: mainstreaming climate 
adaptation 
Mainstreaming adaptation: Politics and challenges 
This article sets the mainstreaming process within a growing critique of the tech-
nical framing of adaptation. By externalising climate hazards from the natural and 
human systems that generate them, objective science is privileged in informing adap-
tation without challenging the political and economic drivers of climate change 
(Brown, 2015). Countering this technical framing, there is growing acknowledge-
ment of the ways that climate change is constructed socio-politically, such that the 
different conceptualisations of the problem are influenced by political processes, which 
in turn determine which (and whose) knowledge and interests are represented and 
which are excluded (Hulme, 2010; Taylor, 2014; Naess et al., 2015; Nightingale, 2017). 
 The choice of adaptation actions to take is therefore governed by political nego-
tiation and mediated by existing power relations (Naess et al., 2015). These actions 
create trade-offs that may favour some (usually weaker) groups at the expense of 
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other (usually more powerful) groups, such as when flood protection moves flood 
water to poorer communities elsewhere (Bahadur and Tanner, 2015; Atteridge and 
Remling, 2018). Technically-led approaches may also mask governance through infor-
mal and tacit policy processes, and limit the attention paid to fluid forms of power 
(such as negotiation) and knowledge (such as learning) (Vink et al., 2013).
 The cross-sector complexity of adaptation requires the involvement of multiple 
and overlapping institutions and actors with a wide range of multi-scalar entry-points 
for mainstreaming. Yet rules of business and institutional incentive structures may be 
poorly aligned to deal with this challenge, and human capacities may not be equipped 
for cross-sector and interdisciplinary working. While emerging polycentric options 
for climate governance are being explored to help overcome these challenges, they 
remain largely untested ( Jordan et al., 2015). Additionally, despite the arguments in 
favour of mainstreaming, in many cases adaptation has been implemented as a more 
discrete set of projects and programmes. This reflects the project-oriented nature 
of both international funding models and many government departments leading on 
climate change in the Global South, but also by the widespread desire to learn how 
climate adaptation and building resilience is different from business-as-usual devel-
opment (Yamin, 2005). 
Formal and informal policy influence: the role of policy entrepreneurs 
Policy influence in the context of this article is concerned with enhancing the pro-
cesses of adaptation mainstreaming: embedding climate adaptation concerns within 
government policies, budgets and decision-making structures. It is assumed to be 
a positive influence, seeking action on adaptation rather than attempting to block 
action on climate change. Policy influence is particularly important in the context of 
externally supported programmes that seek to secure government ownership and 
support for adaptation mainstreaming. In such programmes and efforts, the ‘process’ 
involved in the intervention (how it is done) is as important as what activities are 
carried out. 
 Climate change impacts and the need for adaptation have traditionally been com-
municated through scientific assessments, which can confuse non-technical experts 
and lead to predominantly technical solutions (Klein et al., 2007; Eriksen et al., 2015). 
The strategies for policy influence in externally financed adaptation mainstreaming 
programmes reflect this tendency, and are commonly formalised into technical steps 
(OECD, 2009; UNDP and UNEP, 2011). These follow activities to deliver a set of 
prescribed outputs or outcomes, such as developing new policies, implementing new 
activities or demonstrating changes in decision-making processes. The common 
model therefore typically involves providing technical assistance to a government 
department that can generate analysis of climate impacts and vulnerability in key 
sectors (such as agriculture); development of policies and options for adaptation (such 
as new seed varieties); and translating these into a workplan (such as training of exten-
sion services). Policy influence is sought by providing support to decision-making 
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processes; producing new information and knowledge; and strengthening institu-
tional capacity through training and advice and making links with other policy pro-
cesses, such as the UN climate change regime. 
 This scientific approach supports a linear view of the policy process, in which 
evidence is brought to bear on policy. However, in combination with these ‘formal’ 
technical approaches, mainstreaming efforts often employ more informal and tacit 
strategies. While toolkits and analytical methodologies exist for formal and technical 
strategies to support mainstreaming, these informal strategies are far less codified, 
shared or explicitly written into programming, despite their potential importance 
(Court and Maxwell, 2005; Fraser and Kirbyshire, 2017). 
 To some extent, the distinction between formal and informal influencing strate-
gies parallels that between formal institutions (the written constitution, laws, policies, 
file notes, rights and regulations enforced by official authorities) and informal insti-
tutions (the (usually unwritten) social norms, customs or traditions that shape thought 
and behaviour) (Unsworth, 2010). Practitioners and scholars alike are giving greater 
emphasis to the political dimensions of climate change, where informal interactions 
may be as important as formal governance in determining whether mainstreaming 
is successful (Tanner and Allouche, 2011; Taylor, 2014; Paterson and P-Laberge, 
2018). Development agencies are now acknowledging the contextual politics of the 
government planning and policy-making process, and the power relations between 
different groups within them (World Bank, 2017).
 One way of understanding the processes of policy influence examines the role of 
individuals who are able to navigate the political complexity of both formal and 
informal systems of governance. Such individuals have been referred to as ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’, defined as ‘political actors who seek policy changes that shift the 
status quo in given areas of public policy’ (Mintrom, 2015, p. 103). They advocate 
new ideas and develop proposals; define and reframe problems; specify policy alter-
natives; broker ideas among the many policy actors; mobilise public opinion; and 
help set the decision-making agenda (Roberts and King, 1991; Mintrom and Norman, 
2009). According to John Kingdon (1984, p. 122), similar to a business entrepreneur, 
their defining characteristic ‘is their willingness to invest their resources – time, 
energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of a future return’. 
 Policy entrepreneurs understand political contexts and look for political opportu-
nities to present new ideas in new ways (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). To do so, they 
combine the formal strategies familiar to technical approaches to mainstreaming 
and a set of more tacit, informal strategies. The approach to policy entrepreneur-
ship taken will depend on the personalities of both the influencer and those being 
influenced. Some are more comfortable using scientific evidence as the main pillar 
of influencing strategies; others may draw on personal rapport; others still may 
favour using networks and political incentives for policy change. Crucially, a policy 
entrepreneur is able to make arguments and strategies that break down traditional 
alignments of interests. This deep engagement with the policy space enables strate-
gic thinking about who might support and oppose a particular change (Taylor, 2005). 
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 This article employs the concept of policy entrepreneurship to explore strategies 
for adaptation policy influence while being mindful of its limitations. Evidence 
elsewhere suggests that, while policy entrepreneurship may be useful to establish col-
laborations and plans, its role is temporary, bringing into question the sustainability 
of such an approach (Faling et al., 2018). Conceptualising policy entrepreneurship as 
a means to an end to deliver policy influence may also divert attention from under-
standing the policy entrepreneur as an advocate with subjective goals (Kingdon, 1984). 
 Rather than being purely responsive to evidence and policy contexts, different 
entrepreneurs may be promoting particular variants of adaptation, or concerns par-
ticular to their experience or training. This cautions against projecting neutrality in 
the ‘future return’ for policy entrepreneurs referred to by Kingdon above. As such, 
evidence within this process is not neutral and is a political resource that may or 
equally may not help further entrepreneurial plans (Saxena, 2005; Lucas, 2018). While 
promoting a common policy cause such as adaptation mainstreaming might be 
viewed as collective entrepreneurship of multiple actors, it might also be character-
ised by conflicting activities (Faling et al., 2018). 
 Similarly, as well as promoting certain policy, institutional or decision-making 
characteristics, influencing is focused on preventing negative processes and outcomes. 
Despite this, there is little discussion in the literature on policy processes around 
‘negative lesson-drawing’, or learning what not to do (Dunlop, 2017; Stone, 2017). 
Policy entrepreneurs are well placed to understand why policies may fail and to 
facilitate policy learning—a process that both practitioners and researchers have 
largely overlooked.
 Taking on board the limitations of the approach, the following section draws on 
insights from the literature along with empirical evidence on policy influence from the 
ACT programme to propose a typology of influencing strategies that can be employed 
by those seeking to promote adaptation mainstreaming in South Asia and elsewhere.
A typology of policy-influencing strategies 
The complexity of the policy system and related influencing approaches defies easy 
classification or replicable toolkits. Different influencing strategies may be deployed 
simultaneously, with informal actions as catalytic adjuncts to the more formalised 
processes supporting adaptation mainstreaming. Combining academic insights and 
the ACT experience has enabled us to share some lessons, generated by means of a 
typology of influencing strategies. The typology builds on Kingdon (1984) and 
Roberts and King’s (1991) concept of a public or policy entrepreneur, an initial 
typology developed by Simon Maxwell, as outlined in Start and Hovland’s (2004) 
policy-influencing toolkit and drawn upon by the Research and Policy in Develop-
ment (RAPID) Outcome Mapping Approach (ROMA) toolkit (Young et al., 2015). 
Each area of the typology in turn draws on a range of other conceptual founda-
tions, as explained briefly below. This classification helps us to understand and share 
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knowledge on the strategies employed to influence policy around adaptation, beyond 
the ‘formal’ approaches. 
 One of the principal ways that practitioners, bureaucrats and policy-makers articu-
late and make sense of complex realities is through simplified stories or scenarios 
known in the literature as ‘policy narratives’ (Roe, 1991). Literature on environmen-
tal policy narratives demonstrates that these can sometimes be profoundly misleading 
but they are nevertheless very powerful (Leach and Mearns, 1996). Powerful stories 
can help set norms (such as the responsibility of government to factor in climate 
change impacts and adaptation), as well as to communicate and convince policy-
makers of problems and the range of potential solutions. Importantly, ‘counter-
narratives’ can emerge that support certain interests or priorities, often linked to 
the status quo in the face of disruptive change. For adaptation, the narrative around 
‘climate-resilient development’ has commonly emphasised protecting development 
progress and the co-benefits of risk management even in the absence of climate 
change or disaster events (Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014; 
Surminski and Tanner, 2016). 
 Second, building rapport and gaining and maintaining trust is an important com-
ponent of partnerships with government authorities, both political and bureau-
cratic, as well as other actors, networks and coalitions. There is much evidence on 
the importance of governments and other actors having trust in climate information 
and data (Ziervogel et al., 2005; Tall et al., 2014). Work on policy entrepreneurship 
also suggests that the ability to influence policy has built on mutual trust, respect or 
friendship. Equally, ‘when people feel angry, offended, annoyed, or betrayed, nego-
tiations can be very difficult’ (Brouwer and Biermann, 2011, p. 6). Activities under-
taken in order to build rapport and trust may be informal and opportunistic. Trust is 
also vital for maintaining networks, coalitions and cooperation across the different 
scales, actors and sectors of the mainstreaming process. 
 Third, policy-making usually takes place within communities and networks of 
people who know and interact with each other. The increasingly information- and 
data-driven economy has increased the power of networks structuring society (Castells, 
1996). The role of knowledge networks in shaping policy is therefore increasingly 
important, not least given the ability of climate change impacts and adaptation to 
span geographical borders (Maxwell and Stone, 2004). Networks can act as ‘bridging 
organisations’ between government and non-government spheres and across sectors 
(Folke et al., 2005). Policy entrepreneurs working on mainstreaming interventions 
are also well placed to broker and facilitate coalitions and networks across formal 
and informal actors and spaces. Governments use shadow networks—informal spaces 
of information and knowledge exchange—to introduce and sustain new ideas (Leck 
and Roberts, 2015). Bearing the costs of convening and brokering new agreements, 
including supporting spaces for interaction and information-sharing, can provide an 
effective way to foster institutional reform (Fraser and Kirbyshire, 2017). 
 Fourth, policy change often occurs through individual leaders who develop and 
carry through the vision of change. These individuals (and groups of individuals) 
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can identify politically intelligent routes through the bureaucracy and government 
machinery, as well as bring others on board with a common vision. In turn, they 
provide nodal points for those seeking to influence change. Champions can be 
identified and nurtured through adaptation mainstreaming interventions, and they 
themselves then become the policy entrepreneurs. They bring ideas and issues to 
the policy environment, initiating institutional and policy change by leveraging their 
positions and resources to achieve desired outcomes (Carmin and Anguelovski, 2012). 
 Leadership is increasingly acknowledged as important to address the challenges 
of climate adaptation by being able to (Meijerink and Stiller, 2013) (1) influence the 
policy process so as to get adaptation policies accepted and implemented; (2) enhance 
connectivity across different policy-making levels, sectors and actors; (3) enhance the 
capacity of society to learn in response to feedback from the natural system and to 
anticipate long-term impacts of climate change; (4) increase the adaptive capacity 
(adaptability) of governance networks concerned with climate adaptation.
 However, there are risks in relying on individual leaders and champions. Such 
individuals may suddenly move post, leaving a vacuum, or may highlight and push 
for one kind of problem definition over another (Roberts and King, 1991). Diversity 
may be one way of mitigating such risks. Successful adaptation approaches elsewhere 
have noted the importance of involving champions and policy entrepreneurs who 
span both formal (e.g. government officials) and informal (such as volunteers and com-
munity leaders) arenas (Meijerink and Stiller, 2013; Bahadur and Tanner, 2014).
 Finally, changing policy does not always equate to change on the ground. This 
is especially common in externally supported interventions such as the adaptation 
mainstreaming context analysed in this article. As such, there can be a significant 
implementation gap between what politicians and policy-makers think they are doing 
and what actually happens. Influencing tactics can therefore engage not just with senior 
level policy-makers but also with what Lipsky (2010) termed the ‘street-level bureau-
crats’. Working to influence these change agents and implementers acknowledges 
the complexity of decision-making and the influence of a variety of top-down and 
bottom-up causes and processes in adaptation decision making (Biesbroek et al., 2015). 
The street-level bureaucrats have the functional power to influence decisions through, 
for example, the interpretation of guidelines, the undertaking of performance evalu-
ation, the solving of problems and the actual implementation of governance mecha-
nisms (Morrison et al., 2017). These powers help explain why changes to formal rules 
and regulations do not always lead to the intended outcomes (Antonson et al., 2016). 
 This typology, illustrated in Figure 1, illustrates strategies that are generally used 
in combinations with each other. Points to note are as follows: 
•	 Some	of	these	strategies	for	influence	are	more	focused	on	the	agents	of	change,	
such as the importance of building trust, developing champions or working with 
those who implement policy down the bureaucratic hierarchy. Others are more 
linked to the specific tactics used for influence, such as policy narratives, advocacy 
and networking. 
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•	 The	different	influencing	strategies	can	feed	off	each	other.	For	example,	creating	
compelling ‘stories and narratives’ becomes a lot easier if you have ‘cheerleaders 
and champions’ in place who are receptive to and can help shape the narrative.
•	 There	may	be	trade-offs	to	using	some	of	the	influencing	strategies.	For	example,	
reaching out to ‘downstream implementers’ may take a great deal of time and 
effort, and reduce the chance of nurturing high-level champions. 
•	 Some	policy	entrepreneurs	are	more	adept	than	others	at	deploying	some	of	these	
strategies, but teams can look to build capacities that span these techniques.
 By examining the use of these strategies in relation to the ACT programme, we 
can discern some patterns to provide recommendations for the design of technical 
assistance programmes on adaptation and resilience. 
Policy-influencing in practice: experience from South Asia
South Asia is no stranger to climate stress and extreme weather events, but climate 
change is likely to add even greater threats to ecosystems, economic growth, human 
health, food security, livelihoods and lives (Carabine et al., 2014). Key impacts include 
flood damage to infrastructure, livelihoods and settlements. Extreme rainfall events, 
rising sea level and cyclones could combine to cause widespread flood damage, with 
risks highest in India and Bangladesh (IPCC, 2014). At the same time, an increasing 
risk of drought may cause water and food shortages. There is also high confidence 
within climate science of an increased risk of heat-related mortality, with the region’s 
fast-growing cities already facing high temperatures. The agriculture sector is particu-
larly sensitive to changes in climate, which will have significant development impli-
cations given the high dependence on agriculture for employment in South Asia. 
Crucially, these risks can all be managed to some extent by additional adaptation actions 
Source: authors—design by Will Bugler and Anandita Bishnoi (Acclimatise).
 
Figure 1. A typology of policy-influencing strategies 
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over and above current levels (IPCC, 2014). Yet adaptation efforts remain constrained 
by a combination of knowledge, capacity, resources and short-term political horizons. 
 This section illustrates policy entrepreneurship and influencing in the context of 
efforts to mainstream adaptation into institutions and policy processes. It draws on 
empirical examples from the ACT programme in South Asia, mapping them onto 
the typology outlined above. It draws particular attention to informal influencing 
strategies, which are under-reported in formal ‘projectised’ mechanisms. ACT 
provides technical and financial support to national governments in Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and state governments in India in the states of Assam, 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Kerala, Maharashtra and Odisha. It focuses on helping these 
countries integrate climate change into policies, plans and budgets, as well as strength-
ening capacity to attract and leverage climate change finance. ACT deploys experts 
to sit within government units, combined with national and international expertise 
to provide advice, resources, training and technical knowledge to support systems of 
planning and delivery. 
 ACT’s theory of change aims to ensure that economic and social systems adapt by 
integrating climate change into public and private sector policies as well as invest-
ments. It does so by shaping and influencing government systems and public policies. 
In Indian states, the programme was established under a bilateral agreement between 
the Governments of India and the UK, which has helped the programme establish 
a working relationship with Indian state governments. In other countries, the pro-
gramme has relied on strong national and local partner organisations, which in turn 
have deployed one or more of the five strategies discussed in this article to achieve 
programme objectives. ACT has a decentralised set-up whereby a central senior man-
agement team guides action and monitors progress but project teams in 12 locations 
take day-to-day strategic and operational decisions.
Developing adaptation policy narratives
Policy-makers themselves have suggested that influence requires winning the argu-
ment about what the problem is before trying to win the one about what the solution 
is (Taylor, 2005). Developing and communicating compelling stories or policy narra-
tives is a crucial part of this process. ACT has used an organic process of developing 
and refining a specific narrative for each location (and/or different parts of the gov-
ernment in each location) on the need for investment in adaptation (see Box 1). This 
process of ‘domesticating’ climate change issues is contrary to the popular narratives 
of climate change as an issue dealt with only by scientists or by diplomats at UN 
inter-governmental conferences. At the same time, drawing down from the agenda 
setting of the UN Paris climate change agreement adopted in 2015 can help frame 
local issues in the context of already-agreed national priorities. 
 Early on, ACT carried out internal long-range planning exercises to identify an 
initial list of potential actions in each location. These combined the government’s 
political priorities and the ‘entry-point’ for linking climate change impacts to these 
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actions. This enabled the subsequent technical and capacity support to align with and 
adjust a wider narrative around development in the location. Thus the narrative 
was able to build on floods in Assam, water scarcity in Afghanistan and drought in 
Maharashtra, for example.
 The programme regularly monitors prevailing narratives. For example, in Kerala 
at the start of the programme, climate change was closely identified with the state’s 
long history of environmental and ‘green’ activism, but there was confusion on the 
distinction between climate change and environmentalism. In Assam, the team com-
piles a monthly archive from local newspapers that highlights the local impacts of 
climate change and informs the team’s communication with policy-makers. 
 A key tactic for building such narratives was to link these risks with areas of 
government that are best prepared for adaptation action and build out the network 
and interest from there to reach other areas and actors. ACT has also used a solution-
based narrative to help empower partner governments based on an understanding 
of what an external support programme could provide. In Maharashtra, ‘climate-
screening’ the government’s flagship drought prevention programme provided a 
positive story about the benefits of incorporating climate change information and 
adaptation action. This also tried to match the incentive structures in the partner 
governments, such as by helping leverage additional climate finance to fund prior-
ity areas. 
Box 1. Developing adaptation narratives for policy influence in Assam 
In Assam, the absence of policy narratives on climate change acted as both a challenge and an 
opportunity for ACT’s influencing efforts. The initial Assam State Action Plan on Climate Change 
(ASAPCC) failed to provide a narrative on why it was needed that resonated with the state 
government. ACT therefore had to convince the government of the purpose and value of the 
plan, and of action on climate change in general, in terms that aligned with political priorities. 
In particular, ACT highlighted the link between tackling floods—a recurrent and increasingly 
severe threat for the state—and the need for action on climate change. This included technical 
analysis to map vulnerability and the extent of loss and damage in the state. The analysis ACT 
provided was reinforced by the historically unprecedented monsoon floods of 2017, which had 
impacts on upwards of 2 million people and resulted in above $400 million in loss and damage 
for the state. The team leader worked with local journalists to inform their reporting on this 
and other extreme events to highlight the risks climate change poses of increasing the frequency 
and severity of flooding. 
ACT has maximised policy influence by capitalising on the Chief Minister’s own constituency—
Majuli Island—being one of the most vulnerable districts to climate change and is of significant 
cultural and religious importance to the state. First, the programme carried out an assessment 
of community-level risks in the district, which was released by the district administration. 
This helped highlight the human dimension of climate change and also attract media and politi-
cal attention. 
Another key strategy for ACT in Assam has been to work with sectoral departments on climate 
change-related targets in the state government vision document for achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), developing a digital interface that enables simultaneous tracking 
and reporting for both SDG and ASAPCC targets. This links climate change as part of the devel-
opment progress narrative, helping the government mainstream expenditure for action on 
climate change.
Source: authors.
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 In Pakistan and across a number of states in India, value chain analysis uses a posi-
tive story of delivering livelihood benefits by identifying crops that are climate-
resilient, environmentally friendly and suited to local production and market systems. 
For the state of Punjab in Pakistan, such analysis on canola, mung beans and chick-
peas has revealed bottlenecks and generated recommendations to government, such 
as on crop-specific sowing and threshing machines, that will maximise productivity 
and income from these more climate-resilient crops. 
 One challenge of relying on stories and narratives to influence policy change on 
climate change lies in ensuring ‘unpopular’ issues do not get ignored. For example, 
across all locations, government interest in accessing additional sources of climate 
finance has been a useful ‘positive’ entry-point, but moving the discussion on to how 
governments can maximise the adaptation benefits from their domestic budget has 
been a slow and difficult process. In addition, focusing only on issues where there 
are positive solutions can mean that issues for which the solution is not easy to imple-
ment, or not politically viable, do not get the attention they may deserve (such as soil 
degradation, water pricing).
Building rapport and trust
Building trust with government officers and politicians is fundamental to an exter-
nally supported programme’s ability to influence policy, but it can be both difficult 
and-time consuming (Brouwer and Biermann, 2011). The ACT programme co-
located team leaders and technical experts within government units with a formal 
mandate for climate change coordination, or otherwise located them nearby, visit-
ing the government office regularly (often daily). This contrasts with other models 
of technical assistance that either base the technical team centrally in the region or 
send in international advisors for short-term assignments. Much of the reported 
influence comes from rapport and trust built up through the day-to-day contact with 
government officials, which also helped to give the programme wider credibility. 
Informally, ACT staff have provided advice and policy inputs on topics beyond the 
formal purview of the programme strategy. As a result, when a window of oppor-
tunity for developing adaptation policy has opened, ACT has been the visible and 
trusted first port of call for assistance. 
 For example, in Chhattisgarh, India, ACT has supported the creation of the State 
Centre for Climate Change as part of the government structure. Upon the Centre’s 
inception in 2016, ACT operations moved inside it, strengthening everyday inter-
actions with government and its decision-making structures on climate change. The 
permanence also helped give ACT programme staff the time and opportunity to 
push policy documents over the necessary procedural hurdles to achieve sign-off. 
In Maharashtra, having a technical expert located full time within the government 
secretariat proved crucial for the long process of getting a Climate Change Policy 
drafted, approved and adopted by constantly raising the issue with relevant officials 
and managing the internal bureaucracy. 
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 Building an informal rapport with senior bureaucrats is crucial to ACT’s success-
ful policy influence. The personalities and experience of the local ACT teams have 
determined their level of success in having strong working relationships with their 
government partner. They often have prior experience with the relevant government 
departments and their key actors, and know the local policy context and its dynamics. 
As policy entrepreneurs, the ACT staff often looked initially for common connections 
between the team and officials—for example whether they had had similar academic 
training. For example, personal trust improved in one case when it came to light that 
the team leader’s sibling had trained at university with the climate change nodal officer. 
 Another key tactic that ACT uses to build trust and rapport is to organise events 
for government counterparts without putting ACT in the forefront. For example, 
a high-profile Climate Change Conclave in Chhattisgarh in 2017 raised the profile 
of the government with the invited experts from across the country. As a result, the 
government then trusted that the local team would try and make them look good. 
Similarly, most technical outputs from the programme are branded as the government’s, 
with limited (if any) recognition of the contribution of the programme and the donor.
 Nevertheless, embedding within the government machinery poses some risks, as 
embedded technical advisors could be co-opted into other work of the department 
rather than focusing on the agenda of the programme. There is also an unfortunate 
reality that certain politicians and bureaucrats may accept or ‘trust’ some types of 
people more than others—depending on gender, age, religion, where they are from 
or their disciplinary background, among other things. For example, while embed-
ding helped build trust in some cases, in others the programme was able to influ-
ence more effectively by drafting in nationally or international recognised expertise 
at strategic points. 
 Investing time and resources in trust-building can also be a risk, as relations that 
have taken time to build can be nullified by periodic change in officials or in the 
government ruling party, as has occurred in Indian states of Kerala and Assam during 
Box 2. Trust and policy influence in Bihar, India
In Bihar, efforts by ACT to strengthen the state government’s capacity to manage and finance 
action on climate change initially drew on an expert consultant from outside the region, but 
the issue did not resonate strongly with the government’s existing interests and priorities. The 
programme team thus decided to engage the Bihar-based Asian Development Research Institute 
(ADRI), which had credibility with the Government of Bihar on social, political and economic 
issues but no significant prior experience of working on climate change. This credibility had 
been cemented through strong professional relationships between ADRI’s senior leadership and 
the state bureaucracy and politicians as well as through the vast amount of support that ADRI 
was providing to the Government of Bihar on designing, delivering and monitoring development 
initiatives. The ACT local team has supported ADRI in technical analysis, reports and conferenc-
es on climate change issues in the state and to build its internal capabilities. Establishing ADRI 
as a long-term state knowledge partner on climate change under the Government of India’s 
Knowledge Management Mission on Climate Change will help sustain the technical support 
and influence of ACT.  
Source: authors.
Thomas Tanner, Rizwan Uz Zaman, Sunil Acharya, Elizabeth Gogoi, and Aditya Bahadur S400 
the ACT programme lifetime. In part to mediate this risk of bureaucratic ‘churn’ and 
political change, a policy-influencing tactic common to many of the ACT locations 
has been the engagement of researchers and organisations that already have links with 
and are trusted by political and bureaucratic decision-makers. In Odisha, the pro-
gramme worked with a local organisation (CTRAN), which had a track record on 
adaptation in the state and understood the policy space, having provided support 
since the earlier inception of the SAPCC. Similar tactics were employed in Bihar 
(see Box 2). Again, however, the tactic of engaging established consultants carries a 
risk of implicitly restricting newer, more competent or more innovative consultants 
and researchers who might bring new perspectives, ways of working or efficiencies.
Advocacy and networking to mainstream adaptation 
ACT has helped develop networks external to government that can generate analy-
sis, share knowledge and provide pressure and legitimacy for adaptation policies 
and actions. In Afghanistan, ACT helped the Climate Action Network South Asia 
(CANSA) provide climate change campaign training to a group of Afghan civil 
society organisations (CSOs) working on environmental causes. This group was sub-
sequently recognised as Afghanistan’s first National Steering Committee of CANSA, 
giving them a voice and platform. This helps to ensure these CSOs can work as an 
informal pressure group to enable continued government action on adaptation even 
after ACT funding ends. 
 ACT has also engaged the media to enhance influence, organising high-profile 
events to launch government policy documents. For example, in Bihar, the Deputy 
Chief Minister launched a technical report on financing of adaptation at a high-
profile event that received significant media coverage. By linking to wider news 
stories and events it is easier to generate media interest. For example, in Pakistan, ACT 
provided technical support to integrate climate change into the first-ever Punjab 
Women Development Policy, which was launched on International Women’s Day 
and received considerable media coverage. In Afghanistan, ACT has facilitated train-
ing to journalists on climate change reporting and built a network of interested 
reporters to help with this influencing strategy. In Bangladesh, this influence extends 
to accountability, with ACT planning to train a group of non-governmental organi-
sations, think tanks and journalists in climate budgeting to support an advocacy 
network that can scrutinise government spending on adaptation.
 A different tactic has been to facilitate climate change communities of practice 
within government. The nominated focal point for climate change commonly lies 
within the environment and/or forestry department, which are often weaker in 
their ability to influence adaptation policy in other important sectors such as water or 
agriculture (Klein et al., 2007; Rai and Fisher, 2016). ACT has built opportunities 
for networking and for champions within government to ‘advocate’ internally—
for example establishing a series of thematic working groups involving government 
and non-government actors to develop Nepal’s National Adaptation Plan (NAP); 
Influencing resilience: the role of policy entrepreneurs in mainstreaming climate adaptation S401
supporting the Climate Change Cell in Chhattisgarh to act as a knowledge centre 
and organising seminars, workshops and trainings for different departments; and 
facilitating cross-sectoral climate change committees across a range of locations. 
The engagement of networks of citizens and communities can also help support 
policy-influencing objectives. ACT has supported a number of stakeholder en-
gagement processes to inform decision-making of adaptation policy—for example 
as part of the Nepal NAP process, although it has proven difficult to get sufficient 
representation and inputs from the most vulnerable and excluded. In Maharashtra, 
ACT is supporting the state government’s efforts to build a network of 4,000 ‘water 
champions’ as part of its Water Literacy Campaign. As with journalists and research 
networks, engaging citizens can also put pressure on government in relation to adap-
tation policy and activities, especially by promoting accountability, including for the 
spending of climate finance (Schalatek, 2012).
 Working through networks of other partners and individuals does affect the 
ability to control the policy-influencing process directly. While ACT has been able 
to build these networks’ level of understanding and capacity, there has been no cer-
tainty on what they will eventually advocate for. It is also a more indirect, and less 
immediate, process of influencing, and the contribution of the programme to achiev-
ing the end result can be difficult to measure. For example, the highly participatory 
process used to prepare Nepal’s NAP, involving all climate-relevant ministries and 
agencies, meant the process took a lot longer than it would have if only a single 
department, or a consultant, had drafted the document.
Box 3. Developing a cross-government climate network in Kerala 
Networks within government can be important means of enhancing the influence of the agency 
responsible for managing climate change—extending its reach across sectors and also opening 
up channels for informal influence. In Kerala, climate change was not a high policy priority for 
the government when ACT began. A (central government-mandated) SAPCC had been drafted 
but funds were not allocated for its implementation, and the climate change lead department 
did not hold significant power across government. 
One of many strategies used by the local ACT team to increase political commitment on 
climate change has been to strengthen the influence of the Climate Change Cell within the  
Environment Department over the line departments. ACT worked with the Principal Secretary 
of the Department to ask other secretaries to nominate departmental nodal officers for climate 
change. Many now have a three-member focal team, helping mediate the risk of staff churn 
and institutionalising climate change within the state’s planning and organisation processes. 
This provides the Climate Change Cell with a direct avenue to communicate with the line  
department, to understand and inform its policy processes. All letters to the respective depart-
ment on climate change are sent by/from these officers, and they represent their department 
at meetings on climate change.
These individuals have established a network and more informal community of practice, 
sitting across government departments, universities, institutions and other government agen-
cies. An email and WhatsApp group has provided an informal platform for discussing new ideas, 
sharing best practices and building relationships across the group. This has helped overcome 
the culture of hierarchy, which often prevents free and open communication between and 
within different departments. 
Source: authors.
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Supporting cheer-leaders and champions
Nurturing and supporting people who can champion adaptation and mainstreaming 
is crucial to securing lasting institutional and policy change (Meijerink and Stiller, 
2013). In many locations for ACT, opening the door to policy influence has hinged 
on securing the interest of a high-profile champion. In some cases, this has been a 
senior politician. For example, the Deputy Chief Minister in the Indian state of 
Bihar became a key ally of the programme, while in Pakistan an advisor to the pro-
gramme is located within the Prime Minister’s Office as a focal person for climate 
change. In others, it has been a senior official. For example, the Secretary of the 
Water Resources Department in Odisha, who had a background in disaster manage-
ment and recognised the need to address flooding issues, has championed impor-
tant work with the programme. In Assam, prior working relationships of the team 
leader helped the programme to engage the Chief Secretary to the Department of 
Environment and Forests, where he was able to make the case for Assam showing 
leadership on adaptation. This buy-in helped the programme move forward far more 
efficiently, with the Chief Secretary dealing with the bureaucratic hurdles from inside 
the system.
 In Afghanistan, the main entry-point has been through mainstreaming climate 
change into the Natural Resources Management (NRM) Strategy. ACT identified 
and supported the Director General of NRM within the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Livestock as a champion of integrating adaptation. A policy window 
was opened for integrating adaptation into a draft version of the strategy when ACT 
was invited onto the technical working group and, along with other partners, such 
as UN agencies and the World Bank, worked to support government officers to 
develop mainstreaming actions within this strategy. In Nepal, in developing the 
workstream on adaptation and tourism, the focal point and the nodal officer had 
both previously been posted in the Ministry of Environment, where they had had 
substantial exposure to the issue of climate change adaptation. As a consequence, 
they could relate the problem of climate change to tourism and influence take-up of 
the issue in the Department of Tourism.
 In some cases, fostering these champions has meant being highly responsive to 
the demands and interests of senior figures, orienting the programme’s activities to 
those areas of adaptation where there would be sufficient leadership to push policy 
change and implementation. In Bihar, the programme took up the topic of siltation 
because of the strong demand and interest from the Principal Secretary, despite the 
link to climate change not being straightforward. The programme has been able to 
quickly move forward the government’s thinking on siltation, including through a 
Sediment Management Framework, but the goodwill generated also helped progress 
other areas of work. 
 There are, however, more critical perspectives on working with champions. Relying 
on individual champions within government may privilege the interests of senior 
politicians and bureaucrats over those that might be generated through more par-
ticipatory consultations or bottom-up assessments. In addition, the programme has 
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to manage expectations and requests for personal interests and incentives that may 
be beyond the programme’s remit. In general, working only with influential actors 
risks not being able to challenge the status quo. These individuals and actors, who 
already have ‘power’ within the current system, are unlikely to champion issues that 
could challenge the systems and structures within which they operate. For example, 
in some locations, it was difficult to get interest from ‘champions’ to look explicitly 
at water-intensive or unsustainable crops such as sugarcane, given that these farmers 
are important political lobbies. 
 For many locations in the ACT programme, influence has also been sought indi-
rectly by identifying and working with other actors who have the most influence on 
policy- and decision-maker networks. In Kerala and other locations, ACT hired as 
an advisor a former bureaucrat with strong networks in the government system, to 
help push files through and gain access at the highest levels. In all locations, ACT 
tries to use local experts, researchers and organisations to deliver the technical 
workstreams, who themselves have networks and relationships within government 
that the programme can utilise. In Nepal, working with a local partner, Practical 
Action, meant ACT could build on its pre-existing networks, which in turn helped 
position it in what is a busy field of national and international organisations and 
programmes. In Maharashtra, previous work contacts helped to persuade the British 
High Commissioner to raise the urgency of signing off the SAPCC when meeting 
the state’s Chief Minister. 
Downstream implementers 
Many governments already had some form of climate change policy framework in 
place when ACT support started but recognised that there was a significant lack of 
understanding and action on implementation. In addition to working with and 
building high-level ‘champions’ within the government, ACT has therefore also 
worked with the ‘implementers’ within the bureaucracy. In some cases, ACT did not 
immediately have an entry-point at the senior official or political level. For example, 
in Chhattisgarh, ACT started working with medium-level officials to build the pro-
gramme’s credibility to then allow it to engage at a higher level. In all locations, ACT 
has made a targeted effort to quickly move its engagement from the responsible 
agency for climate change (such as environment departments or ministries of climate 
change) to the sectoral agencies that can inform adaptation on the ground. 
 In Afghanistan, mid-level bureaucrats were the main point of influence, pre-
cisely to take the messages both up and down the hierarchy. In Odisha, while the 
senior bureaucrats in the Environment Department were consulted and were the main 
point of coordination for the programme, ACT worked primarily with technical 
staff in the Water Resource and Agriculture Departments on flood management and 
mainstreaming adaptation into the government’s water resource and agriculture 
planning systems. In Nepal, during the recent transition to federalism and related 
government upheaval and uncertainty, ACT focused its engagement on officials and 
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actors who were not directly affected, such as the Central Bureau of Statistics. In 
all locations, offering targeted training, particularly in connection to developing 
climate finance proposals, has proven an effective way to engage and influence offi-
cials lower down the hierarchy. This includes relatively technical officers, who often 
do not get the opportunity to participate in climate change-focused events and work-
shops, or many opportunities to build their own profile within their departments. 
 The focus on working with implementers is also supported by the development 
of pilot activities. Frequent calls from government for pilot activities reflect their 
desire to see more implementation, helping demonstrate how policy change works 
on the ground and acting as a valuable influencing strategy. While ACT cannot sup-
port all activities requested, given its limited budget and mandate to provide tech-
nical assistance, some activities, such as support to pilot an integrated irrigation and 
agriculture planning framework in Angul district in Odisha, have helped to secure 
wider policy influence. 
 One challenge of working directly with ‘implementers’ within the bureaucracy 
is that they usually lack the authority to take decisions and make change happen 
quickly. For example, in India, the programme has found that bureaucrats from 
sector-focused cadres can sometimes find it difficult to influence bureaucrats from 
the central administrative cadre, even if they are at the same level of seniority. In 
most locations, working with an ‘implementer’ within the bureaucracy who has 
the visible backing and support of a senior officer has been the ideal situation. In 
addition, lower-level officials are often easier to access and engage but are usually 
more risk-averse. They tend to be hesitant to take actions beyond the scope of their 
responsibilities and job description and prefer to follow clear guidance and instruc-
tion from above. 
Conclusions: implications for adaptation and technical 
assistance programmes 
Despite the considerable critiques and challenges of resilience approaches, opera-
tional approaches to building resilience have grown and are championed by major 
donors hoping to reduce humanitarian spending and protect development gains 
(Weichselgartner and Kelman, 2015; Tanner et al., 2017). The Paris climate change 
agreement of 2015 has revitalised a growing global effort to adapt development poli-
cies and plans to a changing climate. Creating and implementing NAPs will require 
a significant upscaling of efforts to mainstream adaptation concerns into development, 
with many countries requesting technical support from the international community. 
However, many of the transferable lessons to date on how best to support mainstream-
ing processes have been in the form of technical approaches such as risk assessments 
and toolkits. In contrast, this article has provided an empirically informed review of 
some of the more tacit and informal approaches used to influence adaptation policy, 
particularly highlighting the role of individual policy entrepreneurs in these processes. 
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 In doing so, this article provides some lessons for emerging critical thinking in 
climate adaptation and resilience-building. The research suggests that adaptation main-
streaming needs reframing away from a series of technical challenges and towards 
an understanding that the construction and negotiation of climate change leads to 
different distributional implications for impacts and adaptation. It asks whether the 
models of governance and theories of change assumed by a predominantly technically 
led framing of adaptation mainstreaming are appropriate. Given the concentration 
of political and bureaucratic power and informality of many policy processes found 
in many administrations, it questions whether the dominant technical models that 
underpin externally supported mainstreaming efforts are reflected by, or even com-
patible with, the realities of governance in many places. Drawing on the examples 
presented here and foregrounding the importance of informal and tacit strategies for 
policy influence can therefore help others designing and providing technical assistance 
to support national and sub-national governments to mainstream adaptation into 
their policies. These programmes can factor in design elements in order to maximise 
this potential, while also balancing and developing the skill sets of staff to cover the 
different types of policy influencing tactics presented here. 
 First, many of the strategies outlined in this article require a thorough understand-
ing of the changing policy context, especially locally. One way to promote this 
understanding is to engage programme staff who have prior experience with the 
relevant local bureaucracies and adaptation issues. However, programmes can also 
undertake regular analysis of the changing political economy influencing adaptation 
mainstreaming, including assessments of both proximate and more distant policy 
drivers. Bringing staff and partners into the process of collating these analyses pro-
motes buy-in to enable politically astute programming and better tracking of the 
intervention’s contribution to change processes. 
 Second, a more decentralised approach to programming helps to ensure that 
approaches to policy-influencing are locally appropriate and support local capacities. 
Decentralisation can also help to empower communities and local governments by 
increasing local autonomy, create mechanisms for cross-sector and cross-scale 
information-sharing among decision-makers and improve accountability of local 
decision-makers (Agarwal et al., 2012). For a technical assistance programme, this 
is more likely to be effective where team leaders in different locations have greater 
ability to define programme priorities and methods rather than acting only as imple-
menters of a centrally determined strategy and approach. Political economy assess-
ments can help inform this process, including by gauging the pre-existing level of 
engagement on climate change issues (Cooke, 2018).
 Third, policy-influencing strategies may also benefit from the iteration and flex-
ibility of an adaptive management approach to programming. Adaptive management 
is an intentional approach to making decisions and adjustments in response to new 
information and changes in context (USAID, 2018). Crucially, this is not about 
changing goals during implementation, but about changing the path being used to 
achieve the goals in response to changes in the policy and programming context. 
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Setting up a programme to regularly revisit activities and outputs will enable policy 
entrepreneurs to learn as they go and to take advantage of unexpected opportunities 
for policy-influencing as they arise. Experience from adaptive management of social-
ecological systems demonstrates the challenge of operating when outcomes are unclear 
(Armitage et al., 2015). However, the real challenge is to establish programmes that 
are ‘committed to experimentation and “learning by doing” from the start, as distinct 
from building in flexibility to respond to changes in circumstances during imple-
mentation’ (Wild et al., 2017, p. 23). 
 Adaptive management approaches may also widen the opportunities for more politi-
cally informed approaches, acknowledging that the drivers of change are often rap-
idly changing themselves (see Box 4). As such, more in-depth ‘development entre-
preneurship’ methods have been proposed that explicitly and iteratively integrate 
politics into project and programme implementation to find technically sound and 
politically possible reforms (Faustino and Booth, 2014; Cooke, 2018). 
 Fourth, the design and monitoring and reporting processes of technical assistance 
programmes need to recognise the large amount of ‘off-terms of reference’ work 
that accompanies informal influencing strategies. Explicitly writing staff time and 
resources into programme plans for influencing can acknowledge the scale of efforts 
required by policy entrepreneurs to influence more effectively. One way to facilitate 
such processes is for design and reporting formats to emphasise outputs and out-
comes rather than activities. At the same time, care is needed so that monitoring cap-
tures learning on successful and unsuccessful strategies for policy-influencing (Dinshaw 
et al., 2014). 
Box 4. Employing an adaptive approach to programming in Nepal 
The ACT programme in Nepal started with an initial set of activities identified through a long-
range planning exercise. Many of those activities had to be dropped or abandoned halfway 
through owing to changing context and government priorities. ACT’s support to the NAP formu-
lation process similarly had to be reoriented when the government received a large ‘readiness’ 
grant from the Green Climate Fund for the same purpose. Furthermore, Nepal has seen a signifi-
cant political upheaval during the lifetime of the programme, including changes in government, 
adoption of a new constitution, wide-ranging decentralisation of power to newly-formed pro-
vincial and local authorities and phased elections for local, provincial and national government. 
In addition, the country has a very crowded climate policy sphere where identifying innovative 
solutions is a daunting task in itself.
The programme has hence had to take an adaptive approach to be able to adjust the work 
and achieve the intended results. The programme team had to be constantly entrepreneurial 
and innovative to identify new entry-points for influence. ACT focused on sectors and issues 
that required climate mainstreaming but were less affected by the contextual challenges. Using 
existing relationships, the programme reached out to ministries such as the Ministry of Culture, 
Tourism and Civil Aviation and the Ministry of Urban Development and presented a contextual-
ised narrative on the need for mainstreaming climate change into these sectors. The programme 
also engaged with the private sector working on tourism to mainstream climate change adap-
tation within their investments.
Deploying this adaptive approach in Nepal was possible in large part because of the flexible 
delivery model and monitoring and reporting framework inherent in the programme.
Source: authors.
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 The design of programmes can make explicit space for private, informal interac-
tions between the team and local stakeholders that can be fundamental to building 
trust. This may entail budgeting time explicitly within workplans to be used flexibly 
and adaptively as required, including for building relationships with key individuals 
and organisations within and outside government. Such programming can also create 
space for understanding and promoting informal and shadow networks to develop 
social relationships. Acknowledging the importance of these networks may also require 
rethinking the personal skills and working routines that are incentivised within 
organisations (Pelling et al., 2008; Armijos et al., 2017). As such, institutionalising 
mainstreaming requires directing attention and resources specifically to the skills and 
strategies of the government and other local champions to influence policy without 
the benefit of external technical assistance. 
 Finally, policy entrepreneurship can be fostered by setting up programmes to be 
able to respond to unexpected opportunities and policy ‘windows’ that open rapidly 
but often close just as quickly, thereby requiring rapid action (Birkmann et al., 2010). 
Programmes therefore need to be proactive in supporting future potential work areas 
that are ready for these windows to open. This can be promoted by creating spe-
cific funds within programmes that are available for such opportunities. Even when 
these are in the wider remit of climate change action rather than strictly in adapta-
tion, the ability to rapidly and flexibly mobilise resources can be crucial to building 
trust in the programme and its staff. 
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